



The Future of Access Control: Attributes, Automation and Adaptation

Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair

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ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu www.profsandhu.com www.ics.utsa.edu

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- Cyberspace will become orders of magnitude more complex and confused very quickly
- Overall this is a very positive development and will enrich human society
- > It will be messy but need not be chaotic!
- Cyber security research and practice are loosing ground





- Most cyber security thinking is microsec
- Most big cyber security threats are macrosec

≻ Microsec

- Retail attacks vs Targeted attacks
- 99% of the attacks are thwarted by basic hygiene and some luck
- 1% of the attacks are difficult and expensive, even impossible, to defend or detect

Rational microsec behavior can result in highly vulnerable macrosec



Cyber Security Goal



> Enable system designers and operators to say:

This system is secure

Not attainable

There is an infinite supply of low-hanging attacks



Cyber Security Goal



Enable system designers and operators to say:

This system is secure enough

Many successful examples

> Mass scale, not very high assurance

- ATM network
- On-line banking
- E-commerce

One of a kind, extremely high assurance US President's nuclear football



Our successes are not studied as success stories

Our successes are not attainable via current cyber security science, engineering, doctrine



Cyber Security



Cyber Security is all about

- tradeoffs and adjustments
- automation (in future)

Productivity


Let's build it Cash out the benefits Next generation can secure it Security

Let's not build it Let's bake in super-security to make it unusable/unaffordable Let's sell unproven solutions


There is a sweet spot in the middle We don't know how to predictably find it and maintain position there

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





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






Cyber Security Technologies





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- Analog Hole
- Inference
- Covert Channels
- Side Channels
- Phishing
- Safety
- Usability
- Privacy
- Attack Asymmetry
- Compatibility
- Federation








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


Access Control Models



- Discretionary Access Control (DAC), 1970
 - Owner controls access
 - But only to the original, not to copies
 - Grounded in pre-computer policies of researchers
- Mandatory Access Control (MAC), 1970
 - Synonymous to Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC)
 - Access based on security labels
 - ✤ Labels propagate to copies
 - Grounded in pre-computer military and national security policies
- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), 1995
 - Access based on roles
 - Can be configured to do DAC or MAC
 - Grounded in pre-computer enterprise policies

Numerous other models but only 3 successes: SO FAR




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RBAC96 Model









- > RBAC can be configured to do MAC
- > RBAC can be configured to do DAC
- RBAC is policy neutral

RBAC is neither MAC nor DAC!






- Role granularity is not adequate leading to role explosion
 - Researchers have suggested several extensions such as parameterized privileges, role templates, parameterized roles (1997-)
- Role design and engineering is difficult and expensive
 - Substantial research on role engineering top down or bottom up (1996-), and on role mining (2003-)
- Assignment of users/permissions to roles is cumbersome
 - Researchers have investigated decentralized administration (1997-), attribute-based implicit user-role assignment (2002-), role-delegation (2000-), role-based trust management (2003-), attribute-based implicit permission-role assignment (2012-)
- Adjustment based on local/global situational factors is difficult
 Temporal (2001-) and spatial (2005-) extensions to RBAC proposed
- RBAC does not offer an extension framework
 - Every shortcoming seems to need a custom extension
 - Can ABAC unify these extensions in a common open-ended framework?



Security Architect




World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

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Access Control Models








Access Control Models









Attributes are name:value pairs

- possibly chained
- values can be complex data structures


Associated with

- ✤ users
- ✤ subjects
- ✤ objects
- contexts
 - device, connection, location, environment, system ...
- Converted by policies into rights just in time
 - policies specified by security architects
 - attributes maintained by security administrators
 - ordinary users morph into architects and administrators
- Inherently extensible



ABAC Status





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- > X.509, SPKI Attribute Certificates (1999 onwards)
 - IETF RFCs and drafts
 - Tightly coupled with PKI (Public-Key Infrastructure)
- > XACML (2003 onwards)
 - OASIS standard
 - Narrowly focused on particular policy combination issues
 - Fails to accommodate the ANSI-NIST RBAC standard model
 - Fails to address user subject mapping
- Usage Control or UCON (Park-Sandhu 2004)
 - Fails to address user subject mapping
 - Focus is on extended features
 - Mutable attributes
 - Continuous enforcement
 - Obligations
 - Conditions
- Several others






> An ABAC model requires

- identification of policy configuration points (PCPs)
- Ianguages and formalisms for each PCP
- A core set of PCPs can be discovered by building the ABACα model to unify DAC, MAC and RBAC
- > Additional ABAC models can then be developed by
 - $\boldsymbol{\bigstar}$ increasing the sophistication of the ABAC PCPs
 - discovering additional PCPs driven by requirements beyond DAC, MAC and RBAC

A small but crucial step




ABACa Model Structure



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ABACa Model Structure



Can be configured to do DAC, MAC, RBAC

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

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Rights to attributes

- Rights
- Labels
- Roles
- Attributes

Messy <

Benefits

- Decentralized
- Dynamic
- Contextual
- Consolidated

Risks

Chaotic

- Complexity
- Confusion
- Attribute trust
- Policy trust



Prognosis: Cyber Security



- > Attributes
- Automated
- > Adaptive
- Managed but not solved



Prognosis: Cyber Security



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Applications Secure information sharing Social networks security and privacy Secure data provenance Content delivery networks Smart grid	Technology Cloud computing security Software defined networks Botnets
Foundations Attribute based access control Relationship based access control Malware models	